The primary issue with making religion a relevant factor in U.S. foreign policy is that it is unconstitutional in nature. Ethnonationalism is incompatible with the U.S. Constitution, and requires the extermination of diversity; including ethnic, cultural, and religious identities. Additionally, making religious values the basis of conduct creates a host of conflict of interests under a theological framework. Oftentimes, nations with significant religious differences hold concurrent economic and technological interests with America, and “the West.” Further, are the effects of polarization. An intensive microfocus on one particular component of foreign policy can distort the broader perception of international relations; resulting in ineffective action.
Unlike other nations, America bears a national obligation to foster unbiased diplomacy across nations. The diplomatic obligation in foreign policy closely replicates a free market system. Accordingly, Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter describe the “circularity of relationships” between leaders, the media, and the public to be “analogous to the classical economic notions of supply and demand, and of producers and consumers in a marketplace,” (Baum & Potter, p. 42). But a display of empirical prosperity (compellence), is greater than seeking to impose punishment (deterrence); (Mat 5:14; 6:22). Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist No. 1, that “in politics as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution,” (Hamilton, A., p. 2). Religious freedom, therefore, remains absent from the national and U.S. foreign policy agenda, as it would contaminate the criteria for building necessary strategic relationships with other nations.
Reasoning
Religion freedom agendas mustn’t be a component of U.S. foreign policy, as religious freedom is central to the preservation of the Constitutional Republic—as intended by America’s Framers. Founding Father James Madison (1751–1836) warned of man’s natural propensity to form factions. In the Federalist No. 10, Madison wrote that “[t]he latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society,” (Madison, J., pp. 43, 44 ). Specifically, Madison cited these differences as, “[a] zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points,” (Madison, J., p. 44).
Similarly, Alexander Hamilton, (1755/75–1804) in the Federalist No. 12, advocated the benefits of a union, citing a “tendency to promote the interests of revenue,” (Hamilton, A., p. 55). In the Federalist No. 15, Hamilton noted “[t]here is scarcely any thing that can wound the pride, or degrade the character, of an independent people,” (Hamilton, A., p. 69). The Founding Fathers thus, concluded that “[r]eligion was a subject reserved to the jurisdictions of the individual, religious societies, and state governments; the federal government was denied all authority in matters pertaining to religion,” (Dreisbach, D., p. 62). This tradition was codified within the opening words of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, shortly after its ratification, (U.S. Const. art. I, §1, cl. 1).
The Founders did not intend patriotism to be synonymous with ethnocentrism. Dr. Shaun Casey stated that “religion is a multivalent force in global politics,” (Emory, 2014,7:55). Religion has the potential for benevolence and provide resources; but are often “transmuted into political or military activity as conditions change,” (CFR, 2015, 47:39). thus we must “guide countries to deal with fundamental problems,” to avoid religious persecution. (CFR, 2015, 48:00). Black’s Law defines Ethnocentric as “[c]haracterized by or based on the idea that one’s own race or nation is better than any other,” (Garner, B., p. 694). Conversely, Patriotism is defined as “[d]evotion to, support of, or love for one’s own nation,” (Garner, B., p. 1361). Contemporary U.S. foreign policy mustn’t adopt ethnocentric bias; instead, its actions should comport with its historic tradition of securing resources and national defense.
Explanation
The two most important aspects of fostering cooperation and sustainable relationships with other nations, despite cultural differences, is the long-term impact of diplomacy on America’s imports and the preclusion of war.
Economically, America cultivates close strategic relationships with nations like Saudi Arabia to ensure its continued access to essential resources. Data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) reveals that in 2023 the United States exported $14.7 billion to Saudi Arabia, and received $16.5 billion in imports, (OEC). The top product imported from Saudi Arabia is crude petroleum, whereas the top product imported to Saudi Arabia is American automobiles, (OEC). Thus, the U.S. economy and the jobs of many Americans rely on foreign trade, despite the inherent conflict in religious ideologies.
National security requires the negation of religion as a factor of relevance in US. Foreign policy, as many extremely intolerant nations are endowed with essential resources. Concisely, Richard Little describes foreign policy as “[h]uman agents mediate between the state and the international system,” (Buzan, B.; Jones, C.; Little, R; p. 165). Thus, foreign policy is an impartial bargain, and needn’t include worldview, nor religious doctrine. America’s willingness to overlook ethnonationalist nations supports its exceptionalism, and ability to invest its resources toward the betterment of mankind. Scripture cites the Christian obligation for stewardship of diplomacy and its effect on the body politic; to “[k]eep watch over yourselves and all the flock of which the Holy Spirit has made you overseers,” (Acts 20:28; NIV). Specific global resources are inherited by certain countries; thus it is God’s intention for nations to exist diplomatically. Righteous actions are conducive to success; the Physician Luke reminds the contemporary foreign policymaker that the strong are endowed to help the weak, (Acts 20:35).
Obstacles
The primary obstacle in making religious values the basis of conduct in U.S. foreign policy is worldview. Christian Orthodox Father Thomas Zain warns that foreign leaders are endowed with a sense of Western approval when they become America’s allies, believing their worldviews to be iterations of Western democracy, (TheAmericanConservative, 2015, 50:00).
Concisely, Fr. Zain concludes that “U.S. foreign policy has been a disaster. We say who we are against . . . but who are we for? Some imaginary moderates that don’t really exist?” (TheAmericanConservative, 2015, 54:25). These imaginary moderates are likely principalities. principalities. Pastor Kris Vallotton of Bethel Church writes that “[p]rincipalities are high-level beings in the demonic realm who affect global conditions. That means world changers are struggling with world forces of darkness,” (Vallotton, K., p. 132).
Yet national foreign policy mustn’t cater to a global agenda, and compete with the foreign policy establishment. Institutionalist David T. Buckley believes, like many establishment international provocateurs that “populists are not true ideological believers in anything but their personal power;” (ColumbiaUniversity). Foreign policy analysts Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page wrote that “the gravitational pull on foreign policy decision makers by the ‘foreign policy establishment’ (especially business leaders and experts) tends to be stronger than the attraction of public opinion,” (Jacobs & Page, p. 121). However, although “business may exert the most consistent influence on government officials . . . policy makers’ views may also be affected by labor, experts, and, to a lesser extent, public opinion,” (Jacobs & Page, p. 121).
American Christians cannot demand that the government coerce foreign powers to accept an alliance contingent on religious freedom. Inversely, America cannot resort to primitivism, mandating theological compliance of their foreign allies. The New Testament warns that resources will be taken away from the irresponsible, and given to the zealous and productive willing to sow its fruit, (Matthew 21:43b). U.S. foreign policy must remain cognitive of its fruits, as a good person is contributive to a nation, as they produce good things; whereas an evil person produces contributes to the imposition of detriment unto society, (Luke 6:45).
In sum, while religion is specific to each nation, it needn’t be factored into foreign trade or international diplomacy. Seeing foreign policy from a system of anarchy, neutralizes the theological hegemony of any independent actor. Interdependence is not inherent, but routinely strategically exercised on bipolar basis of necessity. The sustainability and longevity of each modern civilization is dependent on their ability to act diplomatically, and engage in the free market, anarchic international system. Bipolar relations produce an entwined collective security that refutes the imposition of international hegemony, and rejects allowance of hard power to orient foreign policy. Thus, a focus on national priorities, rather than international initiatives, is better suited in composing righteous and impartial foreign policymaking.
The Clash of Civilizations
Samuel Huntington’s (1927–2008) Clash of Civilizations believed the source of an encroaching “great divisions” in global politics, not to be economic or ideological, but cultural—specifically religious, (Huntington, S., p. 22). But what defines a civilization? Here, Huntington asserted that “[a] civilization is the broadest cultural entity,” and the “highest cultural grouping of people,” (Huntington, S., p. 43).
Specifically, the term civilization identity is used to define the individual global politics of multipolar and multicivilizational paradigms, (Huntington, S., p. 29). Huntington believes that “[t]he most important countries in the world come overwhelmingly from different civilizations;” and that global order is shaped by the interactions of seven or eight “major civilizations,” (Huntington, S., p. 25, 29). Thus, civilization identities differentiate by “history, language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion,” (Huntington, S., p. 25). Huntington’s theory presupposes the world is a multi-polar international system that became bipolar during the Cold War, and now has become multicivilizational (Huntington, S., p. 23). Huntington states that the fall of the Soviet Union marked the return to a multipolar system, whereby “seven or eight major civilizations” have come to dominate global affairs and the international system.
Defense
Samuel Huntington’s theory of civilizations is rooted in historic pollical theory. The concept of civilizations was first “developed by eighteenth-century French thinkers as the opposite of the concept of ‘barbarism.’” (Huntington, S., p. 29). Specific traits that belong to various civilizations include being “settled, urban, and literate,” (Huntington, S., p. 29). But, as Huntington concludes, “[o]f all the objective elements which define civilizations, however, the most important usually is religion,” (Huntington, S., p. 42). Thus, “a civilization is a cultural entity,” contingent on religion (Huntington, S., p. 23).
Huntington’s position is defended by history, citing Arnold Toynbee’s book A Study of History, whereby 21 major civilizations were previously identified—yet, “only six of them exist in the contemporary world,” (Huntington, S., p. 25). Similarly, Henry Kissinger (1923–2023) also believed that the world would be controlled by major civilizations; and predicted six major civilizations, (Huntington, S., p. 28).
Huntington rightly observed that “cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones,” (Huntington, S., p. 27). Huntington adds that “[p]eople of the same race can be deeply divided by civilization; people of different races may be united by civilization,” (Huntington, S., p. 42). This is remedied by its dynamics; civilizations are not stagnant, “[t]hey are dynamic; they rise and fall; they merge and divide;” (Huntington, S., p. 44).
Reasoning
Samuel Huntington believes that the organization of conflict will increasingly follow cultural-religious divisions; as these characteristics are the predominate factors of major civilizations, (Huntington, S., p. 22). Huntington cites historic conflicts are based on religion and cultural differences, citing the major civilization’s influence on global affairs, (Huntington, S., p. 22).
Huntington wrote that “[t]he Westphalian separation of religion and international politics . . . is coming to an end, and religion, . . . [is] increasingly likely to intrude into international affairs,” (Huntington, S., p. 54). In sum, Huntington presupposed religion to be the factor that has come to dominate modern international relations and U.S. foreign policy in the global arena, and believed that its intrusion will persist.
Critique
Critically, Samuel Huntington’s argument is flawed in its reliance on cultural identities and social traditions in shaping its microevolution. Huntington’s argument relies on a dialectic system of conflict to synthesize new world order. Huntington’s argument is based on the expansion of major civilizations, and contingent on the merit of former paradigms, (Huntington, S., p. 37).
Huntington’s reliance on the paradigm commits the fallacy of the negative premise in his assumption that “seven or eight” major civilizations are responsible for global order. Under Huntington’s theory, smaller nation states will remain insignificant on global affairs. Huntington’s paradigm further commits the fallacy of bifurcation, imposing a false dichotomy that “[f]or the contemporary period, however, it provides a useful guide for distinguishing what is more important from what is less important,” (Huntington, S., p. 37). Specifically, who decides this hierarchy of importance? Huntington’s theory presupposes that this decision is delegated to a central authority. Smaller states gain power through horizontal enforcement, as argued by Thucydides (460B.C.–400B.C.), “who wrote in History of the Peloponnesian War that ‘the strong do what they can and the weak states suffer what they must,’” (Mingst & McKibben, p. 242).
Shortcomings. Huntington’s argument’s shortcomings are its assumption that “the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities,” (Huntington, S., p. 26). Secondly, Huntington’s theory relies on the hegemony of “[a]ll major scholars;” (Huntington, S., p. 26). Huntington overlooks institutionalism’s propensity to defer logic to “experts” or, worse, “the majority,” whereby “public opinion” can be manipulated and controlled.
Weaknesses. Huntington’s argument’s weakness is its reliance on his paradigm, and his appeal to the majority. Yet, Huntington submits that “[n]o paradigm . . . is good forever,” (Huntington, S., pp. 37, 41). Instead, the Huntington paradigm appeals to foreign policy institutionalists. Patrick J. Haney warns that appealing to institutionalists is to be “unpopular with many, though very popular with a select few,” (Haney, P.J., p. 295). Haney cites that while institutionalists present a “veneer of ‘inclusion’” in the form of some “commission;” in reality, foreign policy decisions are often decided by a “small group of policy/political advisers and the president himself,” (Haney, P.J., p. 295).
Information Gaps. Huntington’s argument’s information gaps are its polarized focus on religion as a primary factor to the seven or eight major civilizations and the creation of new world order. Conversely, Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter cite “emerging recognition among scholars” that “the public, leaders, and the media that these actors are interdependent and that exclusive attention to one or two of the three may distort theoretical predictions and empirical findings,” (Baum & Potter, p. 45).
Faulty Assumptions. A polarized focus major civilizations as the origin of global power produces faulty assumptions. Huntington’s argument’s faulty assumptions are his presupposition of the “identification of the major civilizations in history and on those that exist in the modern world,” (Huntington, S., p 44.) Huntington observed that “[t]hey often differ, however, on the total number of civilizations that have existed in history,” (p. 44). But, Huntington himself submitted that “[c]ivilizations have no clear-cut boundaries and no precise beginnings and endings,” (Huntington, S., p. 43).
Conclusion
In conclusion, religion cannot be a central component of U.S. foreign policy. Instead, it must follow rational, practical application. It must be pragmatic, yet stand opposed to foreign ethnonationalism, and uninfluenced by international pressure. Religion is not a predominating factor that determines contemporary global order, therefore, Samuel Huntington’s foreign policy theory remains unpersuasive. Further, international relations are not bound by any paradigm, but by political charisma and negotiation. The Founding Fathers were clear in their depiction of America’s non-interventionism and well versed in its diplomacy. Thus, the prospect of religion is an unviable element in conducting successful international relations and crafting lasting foreign policy.
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Jordan Muhsin 