John J. Mearsheimer’s article Imperial by Design, investigates the framework of U.S. grand strategy and its impact on executive foreign policy and international relations. Mearsheimer’s analysis begins the end of the U.S.S.R. and the start of the Russian Federation; marking the end of the Cold War. Former President Bill Clinton “was the first president to govern exclusively in the post-Cold War world, and his administration pursued global dominance from start to finish,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 19). Clinton’s entire foreign policy team was “comprised of liberal imperialists” who sought global hegemony through the use of force to forge an “indispensable nation,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 19). But U.S. foreign policy took a dramatic shift, and “drastically altered its approach to the world” following the September 11th, 2001 attacks. Thus, “President Bush adopted a radical grand strategy that has no parallel in American history,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 21). Obama continued this provisional trend “populat[ed] from top to bottom with liberal imperialists who remain[ed] committed to trying to govern the world,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 33). Overall, Mearsheimer concludes that “the United States should turn to regional forces as the first line of defense, letting them uphold the balance of power in their own neighborhood,” citing offshore balancing as preferrable to “beheading regimes . . . for democracy,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 28).
Concurrence
Overall, Mearsheimer produces a strong and mindful position for U.S. foreign policy, advocating that offshore balancing is the most viable means of national security—not the use of force. Mearsheimer, quoting the Framers, writes that James Madison (1751–1836) observed “that ‘no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 17). Mearsheimer reports that so far, “wars in Afghanistan and Iraq [have] cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 17).
Offshore balancing facilitates non-interventionism, securing the hegemony of foreign powers as a preliminary defense against “dangerous rivals,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 18). Founding Father Alexander Hamilton (1755–1804) asked in the Federalist No. 15, “[i]s respectability in the eyes of foreign powers, a safeguard against foreign encroachments?” (Hamilton, A., p. 69). Thus, “offshore balancing is the best grand strategy for ameliorating our terrorist problem,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 31).
Statistically, a 2001 “Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that . . . ‘33 percent of Americans think that the United States will continue to be the world’s leading power,’” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 17). Fifteen years later, Pew Research Center reported a drastic increase in “[a]n April 2016 Pew poll found that 57 percent of Americans agree that the United States should ‘deal with its own problems and let others deal with theirs the best they can,’” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 70).
Mearsheimer highlights the detrimental impact of liberal imperialists on U.S. foreign policy. Bush’s response to the September 11th attacks neglected to consider the source of al-Qaeda animosity, (Mearsheimer, J., p. 21). Following the terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11, “the president . . . misread what the country was dealing with . . . [and] greatly exaggerated the threat’s severity,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 21).
Worse, John Mearsheimer records that “[b]etween World War II and the present, the United States intervened more than 35 times in developing countries around the world,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 28). One of these thirty-five instances of government intervention, one single nation—Columbia—produced a stable democracy within one decade; “a success rate of less than 3%,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 28).
Secondly, Mearsheimer notes in the wake of 9/11, government officials have persistently driven a false narrative; id est “another major attack on American soil is probable—even imminent,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 22). Mearsheimer concludes “[b]ut this is simply not the case,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 22). Instead, mass pre-programming has ramped up tension, amassing support to intervene with the imminent existential threat by force—before it’s too late. Harrowingly, “[i]t all turned out to be a mirage,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 26).
Mearsheimer’s Imperial by Design offers multifaceted support for non-interventionism. Mearsheimer writes that although many attest that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) “has been a great success” because “no attack on Americans has occurred since 9/11,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 23). Yet, “when there was no GWOT . . . [terrorists] succeeded only once,” citing the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center (Mearsheimer, J., p. 23. Foreign intervention is often illusory.
The withdrawal of permanently stationed U.S. forces does not signify a weakness, (Mearsheimer, J., p. 18). As demonstrated by U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s (1911–2004) decision to withdraw troops from Beirut, Lebanon, despite “killing 241 service members” However, Reagan’s readiness to withdraw forces ultimately saved lives; “the perpetrators of this act did not pursue us after we withdrew,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 32). The Department of State adds that “Reagan’s decision to withdraw the Marines remains controversial,” (State). On one hand, proponents of Reagan’s action favorably argue that “it did not make sense to sacrifice American lives,” (State). On the other hand, critics, unfavorably claim “Reagan failed to stand firm against terrorism and demonstrated that the United States was an undependable ally,” (State).
Criticism
Mearsheimer overlooks the Founding Fathers’ doctrine of non-interventionism, writing “in truth, there is really no chance that Washington will adopt this policy, though the United States had a strong isolationist tendencies until World War II,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 18). Mearsheimer adds that “it will always be a challenge to motivate the U.S. public to want to run the world and especially to fight wars of choice in distant places,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 18).
Offshore balancing is a methodological process of enhancing security to “three regions of the world that are strategically important to the United States—Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 18). But offshore balancing requires the obligation to intervene if an allied nation is attacked; threatening the balance of America’s domestic security. Under this framework, nations must presuppose the benevolence of foreign leaders. Secondly, collective alliances must be formed.
While Mearsheimer’s argument following neorealist logic, it implies the formation of international warfare treaties, like NATO. Thus Mearsheimer’s stance on international relations in inherently liberal, as Mearsheimer clarifies, “[o]ffshore balancing does not mean that the United States should ignore the rest of the world,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 31). Specifically, he clarifies that America should “rely on diplomacy and not military force to protect its interests in areas of little strategic importance,” (Mearsheimer, J., p.31).
Kenneth Waltz (1924–2013) wrote that in “the liberal ideal of international relations . . . states must change,” asking “[w]hat are to be the mechanisms of change? (Waltz, K., p. 103). Waltz expounds, “liberals oscillate between two poles: the optimistic noninterventionism . . . [and] . . . the messianic interventionism . . . elements of realism and of idealism,” (Waltz, K., p. 103).
Kenneth Waltz writes that “[Reinhold] Niebuhr (1892–1971) wrote that “’political strategies,’ invariably involving ‘the balancing of power with power,’ are made necessary by ‘the sinful character of man,’” (Waltz, K., p. 103).
Mearsheimer’s solution focuses on “covert operations and close cooperation with allies” to preclude terrorism, rather than imposing global dominance,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 25). Global dominance omits God’s natural order, precluding the furtherance of His Kingdom on Earth. Similarly the Apostle Paul reminds contemporary leaders, as his epistle was delivered unto the government of Galatia; “[f]or you have been called to live in freedom, my brothers and sisters. But don’t use your freedom to satisfy your sinful nature. Instead, use your freedom to serve one another in love,” (Galatians 5:13; NLT). Paul adds “[f]or the whole law can be summed up in this one command: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’ But if you are always biting and devouring one another, watch out! Beware of destroying one another,” (Galatians 5:14-15; NLT).
The most alarming aspect of Mearsheimer’s advocation is his willingness to give foreign allies access to America’s nuclear weapons “extending its nuclear umbrella over its allies . . . diminishing their need to have their own deterrents,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 32). Mearsheimer’s recipe is a foreign policy disaster—specifically, any political operative or agent-provocateur can execute a false flag attack. Under the condition of a psychological operation, Mearsheimer’s theory is likely to end in a nuclear apocalypse. Realism, thus appears the most viable framework when considering international relations.
The current hot war conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, or Isreal and Palestine should not merit any allied nation a nuclear umbrella, nor should America go to war for any other nation. If the attack on another nation threatens America’s national security, temporary defensive measures ought to be taken. But domestic security has not been the case in the majority of foreign wars fought on behalf of other nations.
Conclusion
In sum, the United States ought to preserve its original intentions as decreed by the Framers; a benevolent leading force amongst nations—not a savage Leviathan. The miscalculations of previous presidents needn’t be replicated in contemporary U.S. foreign policy.
John Mearsheimer concludes that “[t]he United States needs a new grand strategy;” adding that “global dominance is a prescription for endless trouble—especially in its neoconservative variant,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 30). America has certainly been written a prescription for persistent conflict, alongside the desecration of its culture and tradition. Offshore balancing can be conducted in a neorealist manner, without nuclear contingencies or the assurance of military intervention. Better, “offshore balancing costs considerably less money than does global dominance,” (Mearsheimer, J., p. 33).
The bottom line, is that offshore balancing requires stewardship of power and resources. In accordance with Mearsheimer’s analysis, America’s national priorities should supplant international collectivization. Mearsheimer’s theory is sound in its application to an non-interventionist approach, yet lacks credibility in the sustainability of a fundamentally anarchic system. The delegation of national responsibility weakens inherent autonomy, whilst foreign reliance inevitably erodes the fundamental exceptionalism of America’s Constitutional Republic. Global perception remains an important attribute, but image itself mustn’t dictate international relations.
Bibliography
Hamilton, A.; Madison, J.; Jay, J. The Federalist: The Gideon Edition. Liberty Fund, Inc.
History. (Accessed on April 2nd, 2025). Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations – Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/lebanon.
Mearsheimer, J. (Accessed on April 2nd, 2025). Offshore Balancing. https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Offshore-Balancing.pdf
Mearsheimer, J. (Accessed on April 2nd, 2025). Imperial By Design. https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Imperial-by-Design.pdf
Waltz, K. (Accessed on April 2nd, 2025). Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (p. 103). Columbia University Press. Kindle Edition.
Jordan Muhsin 